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Using the World Bank Inspection Panel to Defend the
Interests of Project-Affected People
David Hunter*

On the banks of Argentina's Parana River, local brickmakers took
advantage of the unique qualities of the river's sand and mud to build
sustainable, small-scale businesses. Over time, the brickmakers built networks of
clients and suppliers-a social fabric that allowed them to carve out comfortable
lifestyles. In the 1980s, this social fabric was destroyed, inundated by the rising
waters behind the massive Yacyreta Dam.'
For centuries, thousands of impoverished people scraped out a living on
the shifting sand islands (known as chars) located in Bangladesh's Jamuna River.
The so-called Char people are among the poorest in Bangladesh. Although
under normal circumstances, chars might remain for years or decades, in 1999
thousands of the Char people faced losing their homes due to flooding caused
by the construction of the Jamuna Bridge project. None of the Char people was
scheduled to receive any compensation for the loss of their homes.2
In a remote village one thousand kilometers from Delhi, thousands of rural
farmers who live in the Singrauli coal-mining region have seen their villages
uprooted and resettled, sometimes more than once. Resistance has been met
with police brutality and violence.'
What these communities have in common is that their misfortune resulted
from development projects funded by the World Bank-projects ironically
aimed at benefiting just such poor and disempowered communities. None of
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these rural communities was informed of, or allowed to participate in, the
decisions that would fundamentally change their lives. The underlying Bank
projects were typically designed in closed consultations between their country's
finance ministries and World Bank economists.
These communities also have another thing in common: they organized
against these development projects, seeking the support of the international
activist community, and ultimately bringing claims before the World Bank
Inspection Panel ("Panel"). These communities benefited from remarkable local
activists who ably linked these communities with international nongovernmental
organizations ("NGOs") active in reforming the World Bank. Oscar Rivas and
Elias Dias Pena in Paraguay, Majibul Huq Dulu in Bangladesh, and Madhu
Kohli in India were key links in the chain of support that allowed the local
communities first to learn about their rights under World Bank policies and then
to assert those rights at the Panel.
My work at the Center for International Environmental Law ("CIEL")
privileged me to be another link in that chain. My colleague Dana Clark and I
advised these and other similarly affected people on how to file claims with the
Panel. This Essay reflects my experience as an NGO lawyer in pushing for the
creation of the Panel, supporting project-affected people in bringing their claims,
and then defending the Panel against attacks emanating from inside the World
Bank. At times this work has seemed far from the realm of public international
law, but that is in fact the point of the Panel-it is a substantial departure from
traditional public international law.
Operationalizing the Panel took the active participation of many different
players, but the original vision and conceptualization of the Panel came from
outside the World Bank-from critics who were looking for ways to make the
Bank accountable to the poor communities it was created to serve.4 The Panel
was thus created to bridge the gap between international institutions and the
people they serve. It was the first international institution that allowed citizens to
bypass their national governments in lodging formal complaints that addressed
how an international institution affected their lives. Citizens, and the lawyers that
represented them, were given direct access to an international forum to press
rights-based arguments regarding whether the institution had met its
responsibilities. The Panel, then, reflects a citizen advocacy model that has no
precedent in international law, outside of a few human rights tribunals.
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I. A BRIEF INTRODUCTION TO THE WORLD BANK
The World Bank Group is the largest multilateral development agency in
the world.' In fiscal year 2001, the World Bank provided $17.3 billion in loans to
its client countries6 and leveraged an additional $5 billion from other financial
institutions.7 The Bank is also the recognized leader among development
organizations, often coordinating other donors, mobilizing bilateral and
increasingly private-sector financing, conducting policy research, and providing
technical assistance to countries.
The Bank is governed by a Board of Governors, representing each of the
Member Countries, which meets once a year to set broad policy directions for
the institution. Other policy decisions at the Bank as well as decisions on specific
loans are made by a twenty-four member Board of Executive Directors that
meets several times a week. Voting at the Board of Executive Directors and at
the Board of Governors is based on a country's contribution to the Bank's
working capital. The United States has the largest voting share (almost 17
percent), and all the donor countries together comprise a clear voting majority.
The Board meetings, voting records, and minutes are not made public. The
World Bank President, James Wolfensohn, serves as the Chair of the Board and
presides over the Bank's ten-thousand employees. The Management is
responsible for the day-to-day operations of the Bank, subject to the policies set
by the Board of Executive Directors or Board of Governors.
Prior to the Panel's creation, the World Bank was perhaps best considered
a 'renegade' institution, subject to no meaningful set of laws or binding
standards. The Bank enjoys immunity from national courts, and international
law provides only limited recourse against the Bank because of its status as a
nonstate actor. Contractors or borrowers from the Bank could bring claims
relating to contracts or loan agreements to the International Centre for
Settlement of Investment Disputes ("ICSID"). Project-affected people,
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The World Bank Group is comprised of five separate, but related, institutions: the
International Bank for Reconstruction and Development ("IBRD"), the International
Development Association ("IDA"), the International Finance Corporation ("IFC'), the
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IDA provides concessional or lower cost loans to the poorest countries (those having per
capita annual income below $1465 in 1994 US dollars). The IFC and the MIGA provide
financial support to private sector projects. The Panel currently only has jurisdiction over
public sector projects (those financed by the IBRD and the IDA). ICSID is a dispute
settlement body that addresses international investment-related disputes.
World Bank, 1 The World Bank Annual Report 2001 25 (2001), available online at
<http://www.worldbank.org/annualreport/2001 /pdf/wbarvoll.pdf> (visited Jan 27, 2003).
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however, had no opportunity in any forum to seek an adjudication of their rights
and interests. Affected communities are not parties to loan agreements or
contracts with the Bank, and have not yet successfully asserted third-party rights
before the ICSID.
This, of course, is the traditional trap of public international law. Because
only states are the subjects of international law, international organizations are
accountable to them and to them alone. The underlying theory is that states will
represent the rights and interests of their citizens in these international
organizations, and that the institution will be held accountable through the
influence of the Member governments. Direct citizen participation or
representation is therefore unnecessary (and in fact impossible).
The strategy for addressing the World Bank's insulated position in
international law eventually involved two phases. First, the Bank was pressured
to adopt environmental and social policies that set, among other things,
standards for environmental assessment, public consultation, access to
information, involuntary resettlement, and indigenous peoples. In essence, these
policies comprised a body of laws or norms that the Bank staff was expected to
meet in designing their projects. Looked at another way, these policies also
delineated the rights and interests of project-affected people. The policies
obligated the Bank staff to meet minimum standards-for example, to ensure
that those involuntarily resettled by Bank-financed projects receive comparable
land elsewhere, that environmental impacts are analyzed with input from local
communities, and that indigenous peoples are consulted in projects that affect
their territories.
Adopting environmental and social policies did not necessarily change the
practice on the ground. Over time, those of us in the NGO community came to
believe that the policy framework was either largely ignored or implemented
according to the discretion of project officers based on their own interests or
those of the borrowing government.8 The Bank, having adopted some standards
for itself, was still lawless in the sense that there was no independent monitoring
or enforcement mechanism.
Working with allies in the legislatures of the United States, Switzerland, and
Germany, NGOs such as CIEL, the Environmental Defense Fund, the Bank
Information Center, Friends of the Earth, and others, laid out three criteria for
an accountability mechanism-that it be (1) independent of Bank Management;
(2) transparent; and (3) driven by the local communities most affected by the

See, for example, Bradford Morse and Thomas Berger, SardarSarovar: Report of the Independent
Review (Resource Futures Intl 1992) (chronicling the Bank's failure to ensure policy
compliance in the controversial Sardar Sarovar dam projects on India's Narmada River).
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Bank's projects.9 Both the US Congress and the Swiss Parliament heard
testimony on the potential for an accountability mechanism. Several of the
donor governments, including the United States, linked increased funding of the
Bank to the creation of an independent, transparent, and citizen-based
accountability mechanism. Faced with this pressure, the Bank proposed an
"Independent Inspection Panel" in the summer of 1993. After several rounds of
'negotiation' conducted through the Executive Directors' offices of the Bank,
the Panel was formally established in 1993.0

II. How THE PANEL WORKS
The Panel was created "for the purpose of providing people directly and
adversely affected by a Bank-financed project with an independent forum
through which they can request the Bank to act in accordance with its own
policies and procedures."'" The Panel evaluates the Bank's performance against
the standards set forth in the Bank's operational policies and procedures. It is
comprised of three permanent members, each of whom serves for five years. To
ensure independence, Panel members cannot have served the Bank in any
capacity for the two years preceding their selection. More importantly, Panel
members can never work for the Bank again. The Panel also has a permanent
Secretariat with five staff.'2
Claims can be filed by any affected party or parties (other than a single
individual) in the borrower's territory. 3 The affected parties' local representative,
the Bank's Board of Executive Directors, or, in some cases, any one Executive
Director, is also eligible to file claims. In a deliberate attempt to limit the role of
NGOs and their lawyers, nonlocal representatives can represent affected parties
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Memorandum from Lori Udall, Environmental Defense Fund, et al, to Clinton
Administration, Comments on World Bank Draft Paperon 'Functions and Operalions ofAn Inspection
Function" (Aug 20, 1993) (on file with CJIL).
See International Bank for Reconstruction and Development, Res No 93-10 and
International Development Association, Res No IDA 93-6, reprinted in 34 ILM 520 (1995)
(hereinafter Panel Resolution). The Bank released several drafts of the Panel proposal, which
were subsequently circulated in secret to the US Congress and to several NGOs. NGOs
provided comments to the US Treasury and Congress, as well as to officials of other
governments.
Inspection Panel, The Inspeclion Panelfor the InternalionalBank for Reconstruction and Development
and Intemalional Development Association: Operating Procedures, reprinted in 34 ILM 510, 511
(1995). For a general discussion of how the Panel operates, see Dana L. Clark, A Cifizen's
Guide to the World Bank Inspection Panel (CIEL 2d ed 1999), available online at <http://www.
ciel.org/Publications/citizensguide.pdf> (visited Jan 27, 2003).
For more information, see the Inspection Panel website, available online at <http://
wbln001 8.worldbank.org/ipn/ipnweb.nsf > (visited Jan 27, 2003).
Panel Resolution, reprinted in 34 ILM at 521 (cited in note 10).
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only in "exceptional cases" where "appropriate representation is not locally
14
available.'
Claims must be in writing and must explain how the affected parties' interests
have been, or are likely to be, directly affected by "a failure of the Bank to follow its
operational policies and procedures with respect to the design, appraisal and/or
implementation of a project financed by the Bank."'" The claimant must
demonstrate that it has exhausted other remedies by first providing Bank staff a
reasonable opportunity to respond to the allegations.
Upon receiving a complete request for inspection that is not clearly outside
the scope of the Panel's authority,16 the Panel registers the claim, notifies the
claimant and the Board of Executive Directors, and forwards a copy of the claim to
Bank Management, which has twenty-one days to respond. The Panel then has
twenty-one days to review Management's response and to make a recommendation
to the Board of Executive Directors regarding whether the claim warrants a full
18
investigation.
The Board of Executive Directors has exclusive authority to authorize or
deny a full investigation. Although this led to significant politicization of the Panel
process in the first few years, since changes made in 1999, the Board has supported
every Panel recommendation for an investigation. 9 Once an investigation is
authorized, the Panel enjoys broad investigatory powers including access to all
Bank staff. Members of the public may also provide the Panel with supplemental
information relevant to the claim. After the investigation, the Panel issues a report
evaluating the Bank's compliance with its policies. Within six weeks, Management
must submit to the Board of Executive Directors a report and recommendations
in response to the Panel's findings. The Panel's Report, Management's
recommendations, and the Board's decision are released two weeks after Board
consideration.

15

Id.
Id.
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Several types of complaints are explicitly beyond the Panel's jurisdiction, including
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complaints (i) addressing actions that are the responsibility of parties other than the Bank, (ii)
relating to procurement decisions, (iii) filed after a loan's closing date or after 95 percent of
the loan has been disbursed, or (iv) matters already heard by the Panel unless justified by new
evidence.
17

Id at 522.
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Id.
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See World Bank, Conclusions of the Second Review of the World Bank Inipection Panel, reprinted in
39 ILM 249, 250 (2000). Prior to the 1999 clarification, the Executive Directors frequently
rejected the Panel's recommendations for an investigation, typically deciding instead to adopt
"action plans" that Bank Management had prepared in response to the claims. Although in
some cases these action plans were responsive to the claimants' concerns, the Board's
preemptive approval of the action plans meant that the claims were never fully evaluated nor
was implementation of the action plans adequately monitored. The claimants also never
received their "day in court" to have their allegations formally validated.
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As of January 1, 2003, the Panel has received twenty-seven formal requests
for inspection.2g The Panel has recommended an investigation of fourteen
claims, and the Board has approved ten.'
III. LAWYERING AROUND THE PANEL
The Board's resolutions creating the Panel created new challenges for those
of us pushing for an independent and rules-based accountability mechanism. 22 In
the beginning, we felt as if we were in a constant struggle with Bank
Management to ensure the independence of the Panel. Bank Management
selected the first staff of the Panel without any public input or transparency.
Likewise, the first three Panel members were selected through a shadowy
process dominated by Bank Management and the Board of Executive Directors.
Civil society's suggestions for Panel members went largely unnoticed. The first
Panel chairperson, Mr. Ernst Gunther Br6der, was a retired President of the
European Investment Bank and a former employee at the World Bank. He had
substantial stature in the field of international development, but had not often
worked with nongovernmental organizations. My own view when reviewing his
r6sum6 was that the Bank had successfully controlled the Panel before it ever
got up and running. There was no reason to believe he would be sensitive to
local community concerns or other outside critics of the Bank's hierarchy.
I was wrong. Mr. Br6der and the other two initial Panel members (Mr.
Richard Bissell and Mr. Alvaro Umafia-Quesada), as well as the Panel staff,
including most notably a Chilean lawyer named Eduardo Abbott who remains
the Panel's Secretary, quickly asserted their independence from Bank
Management, their interest in creating a lasting and credible investigatory
mechanism, and their integrity in dealing with all claims openly, fairly, and
effectively. The Panel members and staff seemed to recognize instinctively that
their constituency was as much affected people as finance ministries. They
20

21

22

See Inspection Panel, Summay of Requests for Inspection, available online at <http://wblnOOl8.
worldbank.org/IPN/ipnweb.nsf/(attachmentweb)/SummaryofRequests/$FILE/Summary+
of+Requests.pdf> (visited Jan 27, 2003).
Id. Although the Summary of Requests for Inspection indicates that only nine of the
recommended investigations were approved, the World Bank Board has approved an
additional investigation since the document was updated. See Press Release, Inspection
Panel, World Bank Board Approves the Inspection Panel's Recommendation: The Panel to Investigate
Whether the Bank has Observed its Policies and Procedures in the Cameroon Pipeline Project (Dec 18,
2002), available online at <http://wblnOO18.worldbank.org/ipn/ipnweb.nsf/(attachmentweb)/
pressreleasel 2182002/$FILE/press+release+1 2+18+2002.pdf> (visited Jan 27, 2003).
For a discussion of the problems encountered in the first years of the Panel's operation, see
Dana Clark and David Hunter, The World Bank Inspection Panel - Ampifing Citizen Voices for
Sustainable Development, in Gudmundur Alfredsson and Rolf Ring, eds, The Inspection Panelof the
World Bank: A Different Complaints Procedure 167 (Martinus Nijoff 2001). See also Richard E.
Bissell, Institutionaland ProceduralAspects of the Inspection Panel, in Alfredsson and Ring, eds, The
Inspection Panelof the World Bank, supra at 107.
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grasped quickly the need to elevate the Panel in the Bank hierarchy and to
establish and defend its independence from Bank Management who tried to
assert control over the process. Mr. Brdder led the panel deftly through delicate
times, in the end leaving the Panel strong, independent, and credible to the
communities affected by Bank projects.
One of the Panel's first struggles concerned its relationship to the Office of
the General Counsel ("OGC"). The Bank's General Counsel argued that only
his office had the authority to interpret Board resolutions, including the
resolution creating the Panel. Shortly after the first claim was filed, the General
Counsel issued a memorandum providing a narrow interpretation of standing
for claimants. This raised serious issues of conflicts of interest given the multiple
potential roles of the OGC. The OGC was already tasked with preparing
Management's response to any claims and is the primary legal advisor to the
Board and President on the obligations of the Bank. Allowing OGC also to
interpret the procedures and rules governing the Panel threatened the credibility,
if not actual independence, of the Panel process, and no amount of firewalls
would provide sufficient credibility to the outside world.
Several US NGOs outlined our concerns regarding the role of the OGC in
a short letter sent to all Executive Directors. Almost immediately, we received a
phone call from the General Counsel requesting a meeting. As Lori Udall of the
Environmental Defense Fund and I walked in, a senior Bank official asked: "Do
you know how rare it is for people in our position to meet with people like
you?" The meeting would subsequently become more cordial, but it was a
reminder of the pervasiveness at that time of the view in international
institutions that civil society had little or no business voicing its concerns. We
ultimately were able to restrict the OGC's role because the donor governments
could see how the independence of the Panel would be jeopardized if the
General Counsel controlled the interpretation of the Resolution.
Our goal of making the Panel a viable option for affected communities did
not rest only on how the Bank addressed the Panel. Also important was whether
the Panel would be viewed as a plausible forum for affected communities and
the networks of organizations that were monitoring Bank reforms. To most in
these networks, the Panel was either too legalistic or too closely aligned to the
Bank. Some of the strongest Bank critics believed the Panel was not sufficiently
independent, and not worth engaging.
The Panel members were reluctant in the first few years to conduct much
proactive outreach. They did not want to be accused of 'drumming up business'
nor did they have an explicit mandate from the Board to seek complaints. They
adopted the reasonable position that they would attend conferences, workshops,
and speaking engagements when invited. Except during the Bank's annual
meetings they would not organize proactive efforts to reach out to potential
claimants.
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CIEL and the Bank Information Center accepted the role of disseminating
information about the Panel among the civil society activists and community
leaders concerned with the Bank. 3 In the spring of 1994 at an international
strategy session on Bank reforms, I remember that only a few people advocated
for even trying the Panel. I led a workshop on how to use the Panel, answered
questions, and tried to encourage people to give the Panel a chance. The
response was decidedly mixed as many people saw the Panel as simply a public
relations arm of the Bank. In fact, in the early stages it was hard to argue any
differently. At that time, the Panel's acceptance as a viable place to take
community-based concerns seemed far from certain.
In later workshops around the world, CIEL was continually asked: "What
will we get if we file a claim with the Panel?" The only thing we could promise
was that their complaint would be fairly reviewed and if it met the technical
criteria the claimants would be visited by a Panel member who would listen
openly to their concerns. We could make no promises that the Bank would
change its behavior. This answer resonated well with project-affected people, in
part because it was in stark contrast to the rest of the Bank, which was notorious
for not listening to local concerns (particularly in the controversial projects that
percolate through to the Panel). At least knowing that someone would listen
openly was often sufficient for community leaders to take the bold step of filing
a complaint.
Although the Panel process is intended to be approachable without the
help of lawyers, CIlEL wanted to ensure that the early claims were technically
and factually strong. Translating the concerns of local people into the language
of specific policy violations is a lawyer's task, and one rarely faced by
international lawyers. This is particularly challenging cross-culturally, because of
the need to ensure that the true voices of the community emerge through the
legalese of policy violations. By working with the claimants to express their
concerns in terms of Bank policy violations, we might generate support from the
Panel, donor governments, and perhaps even top Management of the Bank.
Where donor governments and Bank Management might not be able or willing
to second-guess a project supported by a major borrowing country on political
or policy grounds, they could at least question projects that were not prepared
according to the standards set for Bank operations. This was a technical, and
thus apolitical, position that could embolden the Bank hierarchy to challenge
even the most powerful borrowers.
Over time, affected people became more comfortable considering the
Panel as an option. This occurred because the Panel showed its independence
and fairness beginning with its very first claim involving the Arun Dam in

23

See, for example, Clark, A Citizen's Guide to the World Bank Inspection Panel(cited in note 11).

Spring 2003

ChicagoJournalof InternationalLaw

Nepal.2 4 Even the filing of the claims seemed to have some immediate positive
impact. Where letters written from the communities were frequently ignored,
Panel claims immediately triggered attention from the highest levels of the Bank.
Meetings with World Bank President Wolfensohn and various Executive
Directors were relatively common results from Panel claims. Short-term results
also occurred on the ground. Filing of the first claim, for example, led directly to
the cancellation of the Arun Dam by President Wolfensohn. Similarly, filing the
Jamuna Bridge claim led almost immediately to the inclusion of the Char people
in the Bank-financed resettlement program.
IV. CONCLUSION
The Panel is still a work in progress. Today, the Panel is well-known and
credible to outside critics of the Bank. But a recent collection of case studies
from various claims suggests that the short-term benefits that come from the
added attention brought by filing a Panel claim do not necessarily translate into
long-term sustainable benefits.2" Too often, the Panel's recommendations and
the subsequent Board decision provide momentum for change-momentum
that is lost once the Panel's and civil society's attention turns. For longer lasting
improvements, the Panel must be able to conduct ongoing monitoring.
Additionally, the Panel's remedies are limited. The Bank has not yet shown
strong commitment to holding developing countries responsible for the
promises they make at the time of project approval, nor has the Bank considered
paying restitution for damage resulting from violations of its policies. In the
Yacyreta claim, for example, Argentina has not lived up to its promise to provide
funding for environmental and social mitigation, and the Bank has not accepted
fiscal responsibility for failing to enforce those loan terms meant to protect the
local communities. When the borrowing country's underlying commitment to
comply with the Bank's policies disappears, the Bank typically looks the other
way or more precisely has already moved on to developing the next loan. Only
continued vigilance from civil society and the Panel can lead to long-term gains.
Despite its ongoing shortcomings, the Panel set an important precedent for
citizen-based accountability mechanisms. The Asian Development Bank and the
Inter-American Development Bank created inspection mechanisms patterned
loosely after the World Bank's (although substantially less independent and
credible). The International Finance Corporation ("IFC") and Multilateral
Investment Guarantee Agency ("MIGA") created an Office of the Compliance
Advisor and Ombudsman to try to resolve complaints from affected
communities through more flexible dispute resolution techniques. Accountability
24

See Alvaro Umafia, ed, The World Bank Inspeclion Panel: The First FourYears (1994-1998) 17-77
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(World Bank 1998).
See Clark, Fox, and Treakle, DemandingAccountabilio (cited in note 3).
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mechanisms are also emerging at export credit agencies and other regional
development banks.
In my view, innovations like the Panel and these other accountability
mechanisms are the vanguard of a shift in international governance that will
reflect the demands of civil society for a greater and more direct role. Gone are
the days when the foreign service essentially monopolized international
institutions and, similarly, when the role of international lawyers was solely to
represent nation-states. Local communities as well as international activists will
continue to demand and receive clearer and stronger rights of participation, and
the role of the international lawyer will shift toward representing a broader range
of interests and sectors of society.
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